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European Union (EU) citizenship is in crisis. If the Eurozenship debate, composed of
experts on EU citizenship, is analogized to a doctor’s diagnosis, the outcome is more
extensively polarized than initially thought—a chronic disease, not just a temporary
disorder. As I follow the debate, it is no longer clear what the problem is—there
seem to be too many, real and imaginary—or how to heal it. Some issues seem to
be “genetic,” part of the EU’s DNA, yet others resemble a concrete illness that may
be cured, so the argument goes, by a “doctor’s prescription,” which in law means a
legal design.
Dora Kostakopoulou’s diagnosis indicates four problems: statelessness, lack
of citizenship for children born in a Member State with no jus soli rule, third-
country nationals who have no due path to ordinary naturalization, and a mass
loss of citizenship as in the case of Brexit. Her concern is with what Jean-Thomas
Arrighi calls under-inclusive rules, “whereby a person has a legitimate claim to EU
citizenship status, but does not have it because of illegitimate state practices.” Other
authors have added a long list of additional problems. Jean-Thomas Arrighi also
reminds us of the other side of the coin—over-inclusive rules whereby persons, who
have a less legitimate claim to EU citizenship, still receive it, such as co-ethnics
living outside Europe and foreign investors. Jelena Dzankic brings her story—people
trapped in a system of different definitions and categories in Member States—and
Dimitry Kochenov blames Dora for largely focusing on “imaginary” issues, rather
than what he sees as “real” problems.
Having a complex diagnosis, no wonder the reader is lost in a maze even before
trying to understand the “solution.” Dora’s prescription contains the idea of an
autonomous EU citizenship, disentangled from Member States’ nationality, to
be gained by a “domicile for a period of five years in the territory of the Union.”
Her proposed reform has provoked a fierce debate and strong objections on
different grounds: theoretical, conceptual, historical, legal, and political. Every
author, it seems, has a different prescription—from a reform of nationality laws
(Rainer Bauböck), through a full freedom of movement for EU citizens or a “rescue
residence” option (Jules Lepoutre), to an individual exercise of constituent power
(Oliver Garner), to name just a few examples. The only agreement seems to be that
Dora’s proposal is somehow “wrong.” All the rest is disputed—twelve experts have
fifteen opinions (often radically different). Luckily, Europe is not a patient. Unluckily,
this is not merely an academic exercise.
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Instrumentalism, Federalization, Solidarity
Following the same pattern, I want to add—or perhaps reframe—three additional
problems to those identified by Dora (and others): instrumentalism, federalization,
and (lack of) solidarity. As for the first, EU citizenship is an instrumental status, to
the point that one wonders whether it can be considered “citizenship” at all. It has
very few rights associated with the status, mainly free mobility rights, no duties, and
almost no shared identity (i.e., European demos) or participation for the common
good. Christian Joppke rightly observes that Union citizenship has instrumentalism
“written on its forehead.” He finds that it resembles a Roman conception of
citizenship in which “a citizen is a legal, not political being”; such a conception is a
"rights-based and more interest-focused citizenship.” EU citizenship is “the avant-
garde of ‘citizenship lite’, exclusively about rights with no complementary duties
whatsoever, decoupled from even the thinnest of identities.” While this may be an
advantage—it emancipates citizenship from its “sacred” meaning—it undermines
solidarity and leads to some of the problems identified in this debate. Member
States simply treat Union citizenship for what it is—an instrument for promoting their
interests (e.g., selling citizenship or granting it for co-ethnics abroad).
The second problem is federalization. With the establishment of Union citizenship
by the TEU in 1992, most people saw EU citizenship as a “purely decorative and
symbolic institution,” as Dora mentioned in her ELJ article, an instrument to facilitate
labor mobility and promote economic interests; in spite of these assumptions, EU
citizenship has grown to be a different institution. First, the EU has adopted several
directives that have turned national citizenship to a weaker concept. In particular,
the Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term
residents (2003/109/EC, 2003) has created a status similar to citizenship and made
the distinction between Union citizens and long-term residents thin. It means that
“citizenship” rights are mostly granted to long-term residents and largely governed
by EU law. Second, European courts have narrowed Member States' power on
nationality issues. The ECJ has ruled that admission to citizenship and citizenship
deprivation are subject to European law; e.g., measures of integration can only be
lawful if they are proportional and suitable to facilitate integration, not as a means to
filter out people (Chakroun, 2015: paras 42-60). The submission of nationality rules
for the approval of justices in Luxembourg was not originally foreseen.
Precisely because EU citizenship derives from national citizenship, one could expect
that Member States would exercise sovereign powers according to mutual solidary.
The political reality, however, is quite the opposite. First, naturalization policies in
Member States are based on national interests and by and large do not consider the
interests of other Member States or a “European interest,” although such decisions
affect all Member States and Europe as a whole. States use naturalization policies
as a means to overcome economic crisis (Malta, Cyprus) and prioritize ethnic
diaspora outside Europe (Italy, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Spain). The dissimilarity
between Member States’ policies also means that a person wishing to become
European can be naturalized in a more permissive state, for instance Sweden,
and then resettle in a state with a stricter regime, for instance Denmark. Second,
although admission policies are separate from citizenship decisions, they are likely
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to affect other Member States since the regulation of territorial admission pre-selects
those who later may become citizens, and there is a link between the two (especially
in countries that apply the principle of jus soli).
These “problems” are quite different than the ones identified in the debate in the
sense that they are not merely about individual human rights violations, caused
by EU citizenship regimes, but rather bring the points of view of Member States.
Searching for a solution, I believe, is not only about human rights and ethics but also
about the political interests of states. A solution is thus a political necessity.
Toward EU Citizenship Directive?
While I do not claim to have solutions, I want to offer another idea, which, in spite of
its low political feasibility (e.g., it requires a Treaty amendment), is worth considering
—an EU Directive on Citizenship. It can set up three issues: Member States may
agree on common rules, regulating areas that will either be a shared core European
policy or be left to the sovereign powers (do’s and don’ts). For instance, they may
agree that selling citizenship is impossible without genuine links to a Member
State, or that the means for evaluating integration can vary among states. In other
words, states can agree on certain issues, as a minimum; agree to disagree on
other issues; and agree on procedures that must follow on some issues so that a
substantive outcome will be respected even without agreement if certain procedures
are taken. To be clear, a directive on citizenship does not mean a uniform EU policy
but merely a partial harmonization (“a more uniform legislation on acquisition and
loss of their citizenship,” to use Eva Ersbøll’s words). At the same time, it may clarify
legal boundaries, as the current situation leaves states with no clear rules of how to
regulate citizenship without being condemned for human rights violation, and creates
a legal lacuna that is filled out by European courts.
An intermediate solution, given the difficulty to reach an agreement among Member
States, can be multilateral agreements among (some) Member States in light of
the attempt of the Nordic states to harmonize citizenship rules in the 1940s, as
Eva explains. Take residency requirements, for example. If Germany requires
eight years’ residence for ordinary naturalization, a multilateral agreement between
Germany and other Member States (say, Austria, Italy, and The Netherlands) can
recognize the fulfillment of the residency requirement inasmuch the applicant has
lived eight years in these states, even if not eight years entirely in Germany. Such
an idea can solve part of the problem—e.g., Jelena’s story—and, in the long run,
may politically incentivize other Member States to join the agreement for their
benefit. This approach would enable noncitizens to get access to citizenship by
demonstrating “genuine links” to different Member States, which, although they may
not be sufficient for national citizenship in one state, can grant access to citizenship
by showing sufficient genuine links as a whole. Such a direction will not harmonize
EU citizenship law at once but (possibly) in stages.
Dora’s kickoff should be welcomed as a reflection on how to correct the deficits
of EU citizenship law. Her analysis is motivated by Brexit. It’s a “good cause,” as
Dimitris Christopoulos recognizes, yet full of particular characteristics that make it
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a wrong paradigmatic case to reform EU citizenship, as Daniel Thym and Richard
Bellamy rightly indicate.  Brexit is just a symptom of a much deeper illness. Instead
of reforming EU citizenship law to solve Brexit, the effort should be on the root
problems that led to Brexit. Paradoxically, Brexit can be Europe’s constitutional
moment to reform its citizenship regimes.
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